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Original Article
Bomb blast in a tertiary care
hospital, the challenges faced
during management of victims
in a resource limited country
Rizwan Sultan, Hasnain Zafar, Umar Bhatti, Rozina Khimani and
Khabir Ahmed
Abstract
Introduction: A bomb blast in a hospital results in a many fold increase in the casualties. The affected health care in the
region is the next challenge faced by the administration of the city. We discuss the challenges faced after a bomb blast in
the civil hospital of Quetta, Pakistan on 8 August 2016.
Methods: A retrospective review of the medical records of patients who were transferred by air to the Aga Khan
University Hospital Karachi over a period of 86 h after the blast in Quetta.
Results: Seventy-five patients were received in three separate waves; those received in the first wave were sicker than the
following waves. Errors in triage and communication which could have been prevented were identified.
Conclusion: Security of hospitals needs to be improved to avoid such incidents in future. The teams involved in the
management of these incidents should be trained about triage and communication and its importance. There is need for
designated trauma centers to take care of these incidents.
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Introduction
Bomb blast injuries have become common due to the
ever increasing acts of terrorism worldwide.1
The devastating eﬀects of bomb blast increase signiﬁ-
cantly when such an incident occurs inside a health care
facility,2 as besides the large number of civilian casual-
ties, it paralyses the very facility that would otherwise
aid the injured. This results in many administrative
and logistic hurdles including the timely transfer of
these patients to other hospitals for appropriate treat-
ment, which may necessitate long distance transfer—
these challenges are even more profound in a
resource-limited country. The International Institute
for Counter-Terrorism estimate that there have been
approximately 100 such attacks that target health care
facilities,3 although the reporting of the healthcare
implications thereafter is scarce.
On 8 August 2016, a suicide bomb blast occurred in
the emergency department (ED) of a government
hospital in Quetta, the provincial capital of
Baluchistan, killing 67, leaving more than 100 wounded
and rendering the hospital dysfunctional.4,5 Initial
emergency care was provided at the Military Hospital
in Quetta, before air transfer 700Km in three C-130
ﬂights to the Aga Khan University Hospital (AKUH)
in Karachi for deﬁnitive care and rehabilitation. This
descriptive study examines the challenges encountered
by the arrival of large numbers of casualties in this
manner in an already busy hospital and discusses how
such a process could be improved.
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Methods
The medical records and Hospital Information
Management System (HIMS) entries of all the casual-
ties transferred to AKUH from Quetta were examined
for descriptive data; the authors’ views of the adminis-
trative challenges presented were also recorded.
Results
A total of 75 bomb blast victims were received in three
waves on successive days at AKUH (28 patients within
14 h, 15 patients 38 h after the blast, and 32 patients
arrived 86 h after); two were female and there was a
mean age of 36.7 8.75 years.
Communication
Although information about the transfer of patients
was communicated to the AKUH authorities at least
6 h before the ﬁrst patient arrived, this primary com-
munication occurred at city commissioner level and
included only the number of casualties without any fur-
ther medical details. The notice did however allow
AKUH to alert and prepare the trauma team, nursing,
and operating room (OR) staﬀ, the security and man-
agement staﬀ, and receive volunteers oﬀering to pro-
vide their services.
Preparation
The trauma surgeon, orthopedic surgeon, emergency
physicians, nursing supervisor, bed management
supervisor, and the administrator of the hospital
met urgently, prepared a management strategy and
distributed tasks. Due to 100% occupancy of the
emergency room beds, the blast victims were accom-
modated in various hospital wards and elective
admissions were temporarily halted in order to
make room; in addition, stable patients on the
general wards were transferred to the private and
semi-private wards. Trauma teams were structured
according to the available bed slots, comprising the
consultant trauma surgeon, the trauma fellow,
the on-call residents, and the interns in charge of
the wards. Emergency buckets containing medication,
IV ﬂuids, and other relevant equipment were pro-
vided to each area where the blast patients were to
be admitted. Four ORs were reserved in case any
emergency surgical intervention was required.
This was repeated for the two subsequent waves of
patients, although managing beds for the third wave
became challenging since the hospital was already occu-
pied by the 43 blast victims along with other elective
and emergency patients.
Crowd control and security
Given that a terrorist bomb had been detonated in the
ED of a hospital, security was a key concern. The emer-
gency gates 50m from the main ED were closed to the
general public 2 h prior to the arrival of patients.
Ambulances carrying patients from the airhead dropped
them at these gates, from where they were transported to
the Triage area on stretchers, accompanied by single
attendant. Access to the emergency room was restricted
to authorized personnel only. The process was repeated
for each wave. Initial crowd control did not prove to be
diﬃcult as the patients were shifted from one city to
another and most of them were accompanied by a
single attendant only. Problems encountered later were
due to a heavy inﬂux of patient attendants arriving at the
hospital and the special protocols arriving with govern-
ment oﬃcials visiting to meet the blast victims.
Triage
Based on ISS, patients were triaged into three categories:
life threatening injuries, those requiring resuscitation
only and those in a stable condition (Table 1). It was
planned to take those with life-threatening injuries dir-
ectly to the OR, but none met the criteria. Patients
requiring resuscitation and investigations were planned
to be shifted to the General Surgery ward and the
patients who were stable or had isolated limb injuries
or head injuries were shifted to the Orthopedics and
Neurosurgery wards, respectively. A management staﬀ
member was assigned to collect data at the triage area.
Initial evaluation and treatment
Initial evaluation and treatment of patients was done at
their bedsides by the team allocated to the area. Three
patients received in Wave 1 had CT scans for their
abdominal injuries, whereas the others underwent
plain radiograph trauma series and a bedside FAST.
One patient with 40% burns was managed in the special
Table 1. Result of triage of 75 bomb blast patients at AKUH.
Triage category
Wave
Number of
patients
Life
threatening
Requiring
resuscitation
or suspected
abdominal injury
Stable
patients
1 28 0 13 15
2 15 0 3 12
3 32 0 2 30
2 Trauma 0(0)
care unit. During Wave 2, two post-operative patients
needed an abdominal CT scan and two needed head
CTs; no portable investigations were required. None
of the Wave 3 patients required investigations. Six
laparotomies had been performed in Quetta, with
four arriving at AKUH in Wave 2 and one in each of
the other two waves.
Operative interventions
Nearly half (47%) of patients required only wound
debridement at AKUH and 36% patients did not
require any intervention at all (Table 2). Only one
patient required laparotomy and one needed craniot-
omy for removal of fragments from the brain. The
rate of ‘no intervention’ increased from 21% in Wave
1 in Wave 2; all patients had their ﬁrst operative inter-
vention within 24 h of admission.
Visits by Government officials and other leaders
The Government representatives and other political
and non-political leaders visited the patients the day
after the blast, which resulted in crowding in the
wards and aﬀected the treatment of the patients.
Discharges
Patients were discharged once treatment was completed
and patients were rehabilitated; the median length of
stay was 8 days (IQR 4–11), but ﬁve patients were
admitted for more than 3 weeks. The patients with min-
imal or superﬁcial injuries all remained admitted for at
least 2 days. There was no mortality.
Disturbances in elective work
There were signiﬁcant disturbances in elective work,
mainly due to occupancy of the beds by the bomb
blast victims with waiting time for elective patients
increasing signiﬁcantly. There were still seven patients
waiting for elective admission at 1600 h 1 week after the
bomb blast and it took 10 days before there were no
elective patients waiting for a bed at 1600 h.
Readmissions
Five patients were readmitted within 30 days of dis-
charge, two for planned ﬁxation of their limb fractures.
Three were readmitted, however, for evisceration of
bowel shortly after removal of their skin sutures, as it
became evident that closure of the rectus sheath had
not been performed at the initial laparotomy at the
Civil Hospital, Quetta, and this had not been commu-
nicated to the surgical team taking care of these
patients at AKUH Karachi.
Discussion
Bomb blasts within the premises of a health care
facility create a health crisis; the provision of health
care to those aﬀected is not only demanding with
regards to the severity of injuries sustained by the
victims, but because the facility itself is left ineﬀectual
due to the damage inﬂicted by the explosion.
Providing emergent care to these patients becomes
even more problematical if the bombed hospital is
the only facility in a wide geographical area equipped
to provide health care to patients on such a scale.
Incidents such as this raise concerns about the security
of medical centers all over the country and immediate
actions at the level of governmental policy-making
should be taken that will address the gaps in the
security system presently in place at the hospitals
and improve the level of training of the security per-
sonnel. The bomb blast at the Civil Hospital in Quetta
could have been prevented had there been a better
check on security.6
Table 2. Comparison of primary procedure of patients in each wave.
Intervention Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Total
Wound debridement
foreign body removal
16 (57.14%) 5 (33.3%) 14 (40%) 35 (46.67%)
ORIF 4 0 2 6 (8%)
External fixators 1 1 0 2 (2.6%)
Eye washout 1 0 0 1 (1.3%)
Laparotomy 0 1 0 1 (1.3%)
Craniotomy 0 1 0 1 (1.3%)
Repair of soft tissue 0 1 1 2 (2.6%)
No intervention 6 (21.43%) 6 (40%) 15 (42.85%) 27 (36%)
ORIF: open reduction and internal fixation.
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There needs to be a skilled Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) team to triage these patients at the
site of the incident,7 so that those who require emergent
medical attention are moved ﬁrst, which also helps in
identifying only those patients for the transit to the
hospital who will beneﬁt from medical intervention.
None of the patients that AKUH received died and
signiﬁcant proportions (21% in Wave 1 and 42% in
Wave 3) required no intervention at all, suggesting
that although the more seriously injured were trans-
ferred ﬁrst, many were moved unnecessarily, which
could have been avoided by better triage systems at
the initial hospital.
There is a need of a proper communication system to
inform the nearest health care facility8 about the details
of the severity of injuries and the condition of the
patients before these patients arrive; the primary infor-
mation was relayed between government oﬃcials and
the ﬁnal word that reached the hospital administration
lacked the detail that could have helped in organizing a
better plan for the patients arriving.
Readmission of the three patients following eviscer-
ation through the incision site could have been pre-
vented if the trauma team at AKUH had been alerted
that the rectus sheath of these patients was not sutured
during the index operations. We understand that it can
be challenging to suture the rectus sheath of all these
patients owing to shortage of time, but it is pertinent to
directly inform the team in charge at the receiving hos-
pital, so that elective procedures can be planned for
sheath closure and complications avoided. This kind
of communication gap can generate serious issues
even in elective transfer of patients between two centers
let alone disaster situation.9
The AKUH in Karachi serves as the major tertiary
care center in the southern part of the country, and
provides 64 beds in the emergency room for patients
requiring emergent medical attention. There is, how-
ever, only a single trauma bay to triage the post-trau-
matic patients arriving at the hospital from all over the
province of Sindh as well as the neighboring province
of Baluchistan. The hospital has inadequate resources
to deal with such a mass inﬂux of patients, and this is
reﬂected by the disruption to the routine activities of
the hospital at times of such emergencies. It also
becomes challenging to allocate beds to all the patients
arriving at the hospital.
There is now undoubtedly a need to have specialized
trauma centers across the country, which should have
suﬃcient beds to receive post-traumatic patients from
such disasters.10–12 They should be equipped with
trained paramedical staﬀ and modern technology to
allow the trauma teams to provide proper care to the
patients. The government should place due emphasis on
establishing these centers in the country, so that the
trauma patients can receive prompt medical care
when needed. This will not only allow for trauma
patients to receive quicker assessment and care, but
will limit the disruption to the elective and emergency
admissions to a tertiary care hospital such as AKUH.
In this case, there was a 10-day delay in accommodat-
ing the seven elective patients waiting for hospital
admission as all beds were ﬁlled by bomb blast victims.
Transferring the previously admitted patients to private
and semi-private wards in order to make room for
bomb blast patients was not only troublesome for the
hospital management, but it also posed a great ﬁnancial
burden since the extra charges had to be accounted for
by the hospital’s own funds.
Security and crowd control are major issues that
need to be dealt with in these circumstances.13 The
security department at the AKUH took prompt meas-
ures to ensure that the hospital was secure.
Unnecessary crowding within the hospital was pre-
vented by making sure that only one attendant accom-
panied each patient initially, however, extra attendants
arriving with later contingents posed some diﬃculties
with regards to preventing overcrowding at the
hospital.
The care of both the trauma patients and the hos-
pital in-patients is hampered by the unannounced and
unplanned visits of political and non-political leaders;
their visits after such incidents may be essential for non-
medical reasons but they lead to overcrowding and
delays in provision of medical care. The hospital autho-
rities should control these matters and prompt the gov-
ernment oﬃcials about the ways in which these visits
may aﬀect the eﬃciency of provision of health care to
the patients. There also needs to be a close check on the
number of security personnel who escort these govern-
ment oﬃcials during their visits.
Appropriate duration of hospital stay is important
not only to limit preventable expenditure but also to
make sure that the patients are not needlessly exposed
to nosocomial infections. During this experience, 50%
of the patients did not require any intervention, yet the
mean length of hospital stay was 8 days, with even
those who received only superﬁcial injuries being
admitted for at least 2 days; no patient, however, con-
tracted a hospital-acquired infection during their stay.
Conclusions
Hospitals are becoming attractive targets for the terror-
ists, not only because of easy access but also because of
the potential for increased numbers of casualties and
the authorities should improve hospital security to pre-
vent such incidents. The government should focus on
building dedicated trauma centers across the country
coupled with improved in-ﬁeld triage of the victims to
4 Trauma 0(0)
ensure best utilization of resources. Transfer of patients
should always be accompanied by good and eﬀective
communication between the two centers.
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